In its Mayo/Myriad/Alice series of cases, the US Supreme Court has established a two-step test in order to determine whether a claimed invention defines patent-eligible subject matter or not. In the first step, the claims are examined to determine whether they are ‘directed to’ a patent-ineligible concept, i.e. an abstract idea, law of nature or natural phenomenon. If not, then the subject matter of the invention is eligible for patenting. Otherwise, the analysis proceeds to step two, in which the claims are further analysed to determine whether or not they comprise some additional element, or combination of elements, that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.’
In contentious cases the focus has generally fallen upon the second step of the analysis. This is not surprising, considering that the reason these cases are contentious in the first place is because they are typically those in which the claims appear on their face to encompass ineligible subject matter, e.g. abstract ideas in the case of computer-implemented inventions such as in Alice, or natural phenomena such as the isolated DNA in Myriad or the presence of metabolites in blood samples in Mayo. It might be said in such cases that ‘the vibe’ of the claim is that it looks like it might be ineligible, and that it is therefore necessary to proceed to step two in order to determine whether or not this initial impression is correct.
However, two recent decisions of the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) confirm that the first step of the Mayo/Myriad/Alice framework is not merely a formality, but must be given proper consideration. Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp. (Fed. Cir. 2016) [PDF, 605kB] concerned software-implemented methods and systems operating on a new and more efficient database format. The court found at the first step of the Alice analysis that the claims were not directed to an abstract idea, on the basis that ‘[s]oftware can make non-abstract improvements to computer technology just as hardware improvements can’ and that it is ‘relevant to ask whether the claims are directed to an improvement to computer functionality versus being directed to an abstract idea’. In McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games America Inc. (Fed. Cir. 2016) [PDF, 341kB] the court found that claims directed to generating automated lip-synchronization and associated facial expressions for 3D animated characters (e.g. in video games) were, similarly, not abstract, and patent-eligible at the first step of the test.
It should not come as any great surprise that the first step of the Alice framework actually has some teeth. The test is supposed to apply to patent claims in all fields of technology, and clearly there are very many patents and applications that relate to wholly uncontentious subject matter for which patent-eligibility is barely a consideration. In all such cases, the claims are effectively passing at the first step of the test. The surprise, for many, is that the CAFC has finally started to recognise and apply this reality in relation to computer-implemented inventions.
This raises the question of whether there is an analogous process that takes place in Australia. As a practical matter, I believe that there is, however it has not been explicitly set out by the courts, and it remains an unacknowledged aspect of examining patent claims for eligibility. This is unfortunate, because the existence of an implicit step in the eligibility analysis is an obstacle to consistency and objectivity in the assessment of patent claims.
In contentious cases the focus has generally fallen upon the second step of the analysis. This is not surprising, considering that the reason these cases are contentious in the first place is because they are typically those in which the claims appear on their face to encompass ineligible subject matter, e.g. abstract ideas in the case of computer-implemented inventions such as in Alice, or natural phenomena such as the isolated DNA in Myriad or the presence of metabolites in blood samples in Mayo. It might be said in such cases that ‘the vibe’ of the claim is that it looks like it might be ineligible, and that it is therefore necessary to proceed to step two in order to determine whether or not this initial impression is correct.
However, two recent decisions of the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) confirm that the first step of the Mayo/Myriad/Alice framework is not merely a formality, but must be given proper consideration. Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp. (Fed. Cir. 2016) [PDF, 605kB] concerned software-implemented methods and systems operating on a new and more efficient database format. The court found at the first step of the Alice analysis that the claims were not directed to an abstract idea, on the basis that ‘[s]oftware can make non-abstract improvements to computer technology just as hardware improvements can’ and that it is ‘relevant to ask whether the claims are directed to an improvement to computer functionality versus being directed to an abstract idea’. In McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games America Inc. (Fed. Cir. 2016) [PDF, 341kB] the court found that claims directed to generating automated lip-synchronization and associated facial expressions for 3D animated characters (e.g. in video games) were, similarly, not abstract, and patent-eligible at the first step of the test.
It should not come as any great surprise that the first step of the Alice framework actually has some teeth. The test is supposed to apply to patent claims in all fields of technology, and clearly there are very many patents and applications that relate to wholly uncontentious subject matter for which patent-eligibility is barely a consideration. In all such cases, the claims are effectively passing at the first step of the test. The surprise, for many, is that the CAFC has finally started to recognise and apply this reality in relation to computer-implemented inventions.
This raises the question of whether there is an analogous process that takes place in Australia. As a practical matter, I believe that there is, however it has not been explicitly set out by the courts, and it remains an unacknowledged aspect of examining patent claims for eligibility. This is unfortunate, because the existence of an implicit step in the eligibility analysis is an obstacle to consistency and objectivity in the assessment of patent claims.