
The Australian
Patents Act 1990 requires, in
section 18(1)(c) and 18(1A)(c), that an invention must be ‘useful’ in order to be patentable. This is also commonly known as the requirement for ‘
utility’. Failure to meet this requirement, i.e.
inutility, is therefore a ground upon which a patent application may be rejected, or a patent revoked. One of of the ‘rules’ that has been developed by the courts over the years for assessing utility is an obligation upon an applicant or patentee to satisfy any ‘promise’ that might be made for an invention in the patent specification. This is sometimes known as the ‘promise doctrine’ – e.g. in Canada,
where it was abolished last year by the Supreme Court. I had been hoping that a Full Bench of the Federal Court of Australia might decide to do likewise, given that the opportunity had arisen. In a recently-issued decision, however, it has unfortunately declined to do so:
ESCO Corporation v Ronneby Road Pty Ltd [2018] FCAFC 46.
On the face of it, a requirement that an invention fulfil any stated promises does not seem unreasonable. If, for example, an applicant falsely asserts that an invention is worthy of a patent, at least in part because it achieves some valuable improvement over its predecessors, and receives a patent on that basis, then the Patent Office has arguably been misled in its decision to grant the patent. However, I do not see what this has to do with utility. The Australian
Patents Act 1990 provides a perfectly good mechanism for revoking patents that have been obtained by ‘fraud, false suggestion or misrepresentation’ in
section 138(3)(d). But if an invention is, in fact, useful for some purpose, and the patent specification otherwise meets all of the requirements for a valid patent, then it is difficult to see why the applicant’s choice to include – or not – some ‘promise’ in the specification should make any difference.
The position becomes even more fraught when a specification includes more than one promise. This aspect of the utility requirement has not previously been conclusively addressed by the Australian courts – i.e. if a patent applicant makes
multiple promises for an invention, it is necessary that
all of those promises be met by the claims, individually and/or collectively? The Full Court’s decision in
ESCO Corporation has, at least, clarified this situation, with the court deciding that a claimed invention must indeed meet whatever promise(s) have been made for it in the specification.
However, this does not mean that resolving the question of utility is simple in any given case. The court has explained that whether or not a relevant promise has been made and met must be addressed, by determining whether the invention
as claimed does what it is intended by the patentee to do. This necessarily involves an enquiry into the patentee’s intentions, through consideration of the specification as a whole, including the claims. It is therefore not simply a matter of identifying some explicit, straightforward, statement in the specification that appears to make one or more ‘promises’ –
as the court did (wrongly) at first instance in the ESCO case – and asking whether the claimed invention satisfies all of the stated ‘promises’.
As a result of conducting the required enquiry, it can become apparent that the invention, as defined in a specific claim, or group of claims, was not intended to satisfy all of the ‘promises’ made in the specification. In ESCO’s case this was necessarily so, because its application included two groups of claims defining different aspects of the invention (a component, and an assembly including the component, respectively) that might encompass different subsets of the advantages asserted for the invention as a whole.
So while I would have liked to see Australia follow Canada in cutting ties with old UK law and abandoning the ‘promise doctrine’, the Full Court in
ESCO Corporation has at least brought some much-needed sense to the Australian law. Determining whether or not an invention is ‘useful’ is not some formulaic exercise involving the mere comparison of statements in the specification with the subject matter of the claims. Rather, it is a matter of substance, whereby the intentions of the applicant or patentee are to be determined, at least insofar as they are expressed in the specification as a whole, in relation to each claim, or group of claims. On the other hand, the decision may not go far enough, in that it is not clear that it necessarily applies to cases in which there are not two or more distinct groups of claims relating to different aspects of an invention.