22 December 2020

DABUS Down Under – Can an AI ‘Communicate’ an Invention to a Human Applicant?

Xmas robotBack in September I reported that an application naming an ‘artificial intelligence’ going by the name DABUS (‘Device for the Autonomous Bootstrapping of Unified Sentience’) as inventor had been filed in Australia.  The application – no. 2019363177 – was derived from an international application filed under the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT), and names Dr Stephen Thaler, the developer of DABUS, as applicant.  The Australian Patent Office issued a formalities report, objecting that the application does not comply with the Patents Regulations 1991, because ‘it is the Commissioner’s understanding that inventors for the purposes of the Patents Act 1990 must be natural persons.  As DABUS is not a natural person the Commissioner is of the view that no inventor has been supplied for the purposes of Regulation 3.2C(2)(aa).’  There has since been further correspondence between Dr Thaler’s Australian patent attorneys and the Patent Office.  Thus far, however, the initial objections have not been overcome, and it seems likely that the matter is headed for a hearing, which will result in a formal decision being issued.

On 19 November 2020, the applicant responded to the initial formalities report.  For some reason, this response is not currently available in the public ‘eDossier’ for the application, however the Patent Office’s reply of 25 November 2020 sets out the substance of the response:

You have indicated that there is no explicit definition of an inventor, which by implication means that an artificial intelligence machine can be an inventor. You have also stated that it is sufficient for the purposes of the Patents Act 1990 if the applicant derives title to the invention from the inventor under section 15(1)(c). In the present case this would require DABUS to transfer title to Stephen Thaler. It is not apparent that DABUS is capable of executing an assignment, or has a contract of employment (for instance).

Interestingly, however, the Patent Office reply goes further, by suggesting an alternative theory (not, it seems, put forward in the applicant’s response) under which the Dr Thaler might assert the right to be granted a patent:

It may be that you are suggesting that Dr Thaler should be regarded as the communicatee of DABUS (a category of applicants recognised under section 34(1)(e) of the 1952 Act, and amalgamated into the present section 15(1)(c) - JMVB Enterprises Pty Ltd v Camoflag Pty Ltd [2006] FCAFC 141). According to traditional principles the communication should be for the purpose of obtaining a patent (H's Application (1955) 73 RPC 197).

The significance of identifying a mechanism for Dr Thaler to derive rights to DABUS’ inventions is that, in the Office’s view, if DABUS ‘is not capable of transferring or communicating an invention to a person, it would appear to be inconsistent with the structure of the Act for the machine to be treated as an inventor for the purposes of the Act.’  However, quite why the Office should wish to make its own suggestions in this regard is something of a mystery.

The applicant, for his part, appears to want no part of this novel theory proposed by the Patent Office.  In a further reply dated 9 December 2020, his attorneys have argued simply that:

The common law confers ownership of anything produced by DABUS to its owner, the applicant. There is a general rule that the owner of a thing is the owner of the fruits of that thing, much like the owner of a fruit tree is entitled to the fruit produced by that tree. The principle of accession or first possession can apply.

I think that this is the right approach (even though it is unlikely to succeed).  A UK court has already ruled that DABUS is incapable of transferring intellectual property rights to Dr Thaler (or anybody else), and there is no reason to expect a different outcome in Australia.  Furthermore, an analysis of the historical basis for the category of ‘communicatee’ suggests that it may no longer exist under Australia’s current patent laws and that, in any event, it would not provide for Dr Thaler to obtain a patent on DABUS’ inventions.  His best bet is therefore to continue to push the ‘ownership’ line, even though it has so far failed in the UK, the US, and at the European Patent Office.  I believe that it will fail in Australia, also, under the existing law.  But my understanding is that the larger objective of the Artificial Inventor Project, which is backing Dr Thaler’s applications, is to lobby for changes in the law, to recognise AI inventors, and entitlement by way of ownership.

In any event, the Patent Office’s unusual proposition provides an opportunity to delve into this strange historical category of ‘communicatee’.  What is it?  Why did it exist?  Does it still exist somewhere in the modern patent law?  (Readers interested only in Dr Thaler’s prospects of success, and not the historical context, can skip ahead to the section entitled ‘Can Title to an Invention be Derived from an AI?’)

30 November 2020

How the Australian High Court Found that Refurbished Ink Cartridges do not Infringe Seiko Patents

InkRecently, I wrote about the decision of the High Court in Calidad Pty Ltd v Seiko Epson Corporation [2020] HCA 41, with particular focus on the Court’s finding, by a 4-3 majority, that the first sale of a patented product exhausts the patentee’s exclusive rights in that product.  In this article, I will look at the other aspect of the Court’s decision, namely its finding (again by 4-3 majority) that Epson printer ink cartridges that had been refurbished, refilled, and resold in Australia, did not infringe patents relating to aspects of the cartridges, which are owned by Seiko.

As we shall see, the decision of the High Court majority on infringement depended upon a distinction between use of a patented product following sale, and making of a new embodiment of the patented product.  It did not depend upon whether the (old) ‘implied licence’ doctrine, or the (new) ‘exhaustion’ doctrine applies under Australian law.  In this sense, it was not necessary for the Court to overturn over a century of law to replace the doctrine of implied licence with one of exhaustion, although it did so nonetheless, and it is that aspect of the case that has attracted most attention.

The reasoning of the majority on infringement is important, however, in giving guidance to lower courts, patentees, and providers of refurbished goods, on the circumstances in which modifying, repairing, or reconstituting of depleted or otherwise ‘expired’ goods may result in patent infringement.

29 November 2020

COVID Update – October Filings Down, as Pandemic Pain not Shared Equally Among Attorney Firms

COVID-normal workingLast month I reported that, against the trend of 2020, September was a busy month for Australian patent filings, with standard applications up by 8.1% on the same month in 2019.  (In fact, following more recent additions and corrections in IP Australia’s records, the increase is even higher, at 9.2%.)  But, sadly, any optimism this might have generated was short-lived, with October filings down by 7.9% on last year.  Numbers of new filings originating in Australia, the US, Japan, and Europe were all substantially lower than in October 2019, although applications from China once again bucked the trend.  Filings from all other countries were comparable to 2019, down by just 0.7%.

Counted at the end of October, Chinese applicants have filed 1822 Australian standard patent applications during 2020, just 6% behind Australian applicants at 1937.  This compares with 1410 applications filed by Chinese applicants at the same time in 2019.  Most of these gains have come in the second half of the year, with monthly filings from China being substantially higher than during 2019 in every month since June.  If this trend continues for the final two months of the year, Chinese residents will surpass Australians for the first time as the second largest users of the Australian patent system after the US.

Chinese applicants also continued to make ridiculously high use of the innovation patent system, reflecting the effect of subsidies back in China, rather than any inherent value of the innovation patents themselves.  By the end of October, Chinese residents had filed 1719 innovation patent applications, compared with just 332 at the same point in 2019.  Meanwhile, Australian residents filed 801 innovation patent applications, with a further 618 coming from the rest of the world combined.  With just nine months remaining until its abolition, the innovation patent system is now looking very much like the laughing stock that it has long been regarded as by some critics.

For the ‘coronavirus-affected’ period from March to October, the number of standard patent applications filed in Australia is 2.4% below the same period last year while provisional filings are down by 3.0% overall.  However, a relatively large number of provisional applications are filed by self-represented applicants, and the decline in professionally prepared and filed provisionals is slightly higher, at 4.4%.

While all of this means fewer standard and provisional filings for the patent attorney profession generally, the pain has not been shared equally.  Indeed, some sectors of the market, and individual firms, have seen growth in their filings compared with 2019, while others have experienced more significant declines.  Very broadly speaking, the best place to be, in terms of 2020 patent filings, is a medium-sized or large privately-held firm, although micro-practices and medium-sized firms within the listed groups have also collectively increased their share of standard patent filings during the pandemic.

12 November 2020

Australian High Court Finds that Sale of a Patented Product Exhausts Patentee’s Rights

PrinterIn a significant judgment, the High Court of Australia has changed an aspect of patent law in Australia, ruling by a 4-3 majority that the first sale of a patented product exhausts the patentee’s exclusive rights in that product: Calidad Pty Ltd v Seiko Epson Corporation [2020] HCA 41.  For over a century, an alternative approach, based on an ‘implied licence’ theory, has applied.  While the distinction between these two approaches may not necessarily produce a different outcome in most practical circumstances, the implied licence approach has generated complications, and left Australian law out-of-step with some of our major trading partners, most notably the US and the European Union.  For reasons of simplification and harmonisation, therefore, the High Court’s ruling will be welcomed by many – myself included.

The decision of the High Court majority is also notable for the fact that the court has wasted no time in recognising the ‘objects clause’ in section 2A of the Patents Act 1990.  This clause, which sets out underlying purposes of the Act (in economic and social terms) was only enacted in February 2020, and this is literally the very first patent case that the High Court has decided since then.

The case involves printer ink cartridges, and in particular the refurbishment, refilling, and resale of cartridges, which are generally available at a lower price than cartridges sold by the original manufacturer.  Australian consumers will therefore be pleased to learn that the High Court has determined – in addition to the esoteric legal question of ‘exhaustion’ – that, in this case at least, the refilled cartridges do not infringe patent rights held by the original manufacturer, and can therefore be imported and sold in Australia.  I will discuss the ‘exhaustion’ aspect in this article, and save a review of the infringement decision for a separate post.

30 October 2020

Games — Now Less Patentable than Ever in Australia

RouletteIn a recent decision, a Hearing Officer within the Australian Patent Office rejected Australian patent application no. 2018219972, in the name of casino operator Crown Melbourne Ltd, relating to a modified roulette table layout.  In particular, the claimed invention was designed to provide a ‘double zero’ roulette game having similar visual appearance and betting options to a ‘single zero’ game, while also offering additional betting options over the traditional ‘double zero’ game.  In essence, the modified layout ‘stacks’ the single and double zero boxes at one end of the number grid, instead of placing them side-by-side in the previously-established manner.  The application was rejected on the ground that the subject matter of the claimed invention is ineligible for patenting, i.e. is not for a ‘manner of manufacture’ under Australian law.  Specifically, the Hearing Officer found that ‘merely presenting a different wagering space layout that does nothing otherwise to the functioning of the apparatus cannot be considered as a physical phenomenon or transformation’, which would have been required for the invention to be patent-eligible.

You might not be surprised by this outcome.  Surely – you might think – simply providing a different layout of the numbered boxes on a roulette table cannot be the kind of thing for which a patent may be granted?  Traditionally, however, the situation would not have been considered so clear-cut.  Changing the layout also changes the wagering options available to players of the game.  The layout thus interacts with the rules of the game to change the game itself, arguably producing a ‘new’ game.  Throughout most of the history of the Australian patent system, this would have been considered patentable.

But you do not have to take my word for this.  The very same claims were previously found to be patentable by the Australian Patent Office!  The rejected application is a divisional, the ultimate ancestor of which was application no. 2008203384 (‘the original application’).  That application was itself filed in parallel with innovation patent no. 2008100694 (‘the innovation patent’).  The innovation patent was examined in 2008, and successfully certified on 5 February 2009.  The original application was also eventually examined, and received a clear examination report on 3 November 2014.  The only reason the original application did not proceed to acceptance and grant was because the innovation patent remained in force, and section 64 of the Australian Patents Act 1990 prohibits a single owner from being granted two patents simultaneously for the same invention.  After the innovation patent expired on 25 July 2016, Crown submitted that the original application should then proceed to acceptance.  But, instead, the Patent Office issued an adverse examination report, including the objection that the claimed invention was not a patentable ‘manner of manufacture’.

So, what changed?  The law?  Patent Office practice?  Or something less easily identified?

In this article, I discuss developments over the past 20 years in the patentability of games in Australia.  In summary, it seems that as recently as 2003 it was relatively straightforward to obtain a patent for a game, with the overwhelming majority of examined applications being successful.  Over time it has become substantially more difficult, although there are numerous examples of a relatively liberal approach by the Australian Patent Office up until at least the early 2010’s.  But since 2015 the tide has definitely turned, and patent applications relating to games now fail more often than they succeed.  The recent Aristocrat decision provides a glimmer of hope for game innovators, suggesting the possibility of a return to the principle that a working inter-relationship between game apparatus and associated rules of play may be sufficient to support a valid patent.  However, with this decision currently under appeal, and the Patent Office applying it narrowly only to certain types of analogous computer-implemented casino gaming systems, the prospects of any significant new liberalisation of examination practice in this area seem limited.


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