I recently wrote about the decision of the Federal Court of Australia in Repipe Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Patents [2019] FCA 1956, in which two innovation patents owned by RePipe were found to be invalid, and thus liable to be revoked, on the ground that neither was for a patent-eligible ‘manner of manufacture’ under Australian law. In that article, I noted that even when software innovators, like RePipe, make substantial investments and incur significant business risks in devising, developing, and bringing an invention to market, they may find themselves unable to access the same protection under the Australian patent system that is available to innovators in other fields of technology. I observed that while some relatively trivial, low-social-impact, and low-risk innovations, such as a ‘packing box for shuffled playing cards’, enjoy uncontroversial patent protection, RePipe’s sophisticated, high-impact, high-risk, development of a networked system for improving workplace health and safety, is denied protection on the basis that it is a ‘mere scheme’ implemented using ‘standard’ or ‘generic’ hardware and software.
I questioned the policy basis for this distinction, in view of the classical economic rationale for having a patent system, viz., to provide an incentive for individuals and businesses to engage in the risky process of invention, development, and marketing of new products and services. Which is all very well when this process of commercialisation actually takes place, and there is a genuine investment to be protected. But that is not always the case. Sometimes, the only ‘investment’ is in the preparation and filing of a patent application. And where the claimed invention is software-implemented, a suspicion may arise that the real ‘work’ of innovation, which would justify the grant of exclusive patent rights under the classical rationale, can be avoided.
I believe it is this suspicion that has caused courts and patent offices – along with legislators, in those jurisdictions that have chosen to impose statutory restrictions on patenting of ‘computer programs’ – so much angst. This has led, in turn, to confusion and inconsistency in decision-making, such that the patent system can appear capricious, unpredictable, and discriminatory when applied to software innovations. This is bad for innovative businesses that can add confusion and uncertainty around the availability of patent protection, for themselves and their competitors, to all of the other risks and unknowns that they already face in developing and commercialising new products and services.
The patent system is supposed to be ‘technology neutral’, and capable of adapting to new developments and the emergence of new technologies. However, it plainly is not. The primary legal tests for determining what is, and is not, deserving of patent protection – novelty, inventive step, and the provision of a sufficient disclosure of the invention – are proving inadequate to deal fairly and consistently with computer-implemented innovations. As a result, the blunt instrument of subject matter eligibility has become the tool of choice for striking down claims that are deemed to be unworthy of protection.
I questioned the policy basis for this distinction, in view of the classical economic rationale for having a patent system, viz., to provide an incentive for individuals and businesses to engage in the risky process of invention, development, and marketing of new products and services. Which is all very well when this process of commercialisation actually takes place, and there is a genuine investment to be protected. But that is not always the case. Sometimes, the only ‘investment’ is in the preparation and filing of a patent application. And where the claimed invention is software-implemented, a suspicion may arise that the real ‘work’ of innovation, which would justify the grant of exclusive patent rights under the classical rationale, can be avoided.
I believe it is this suspicion that has caused courts and patent offices – along with legislators, in those jurisdictions that have chosen to impose statutory restrictions on patenting of ‘computer programs’ – so much angst. This has led, in turn, to confusion and inconsistency in decision-making, such that the patent system can appear capricious, unpredictable, and discriminatory when applied to software innovations. This is bad for innovative businesses that can add confusion and uncertainty around the availability of patent protection, for themselves and their competitors, to all of the other risks and unknowns that they already face in developing and commercialising new products and services.
The patent system is supposed to be ‘technology neutral’, and capable of adapting to new developments and the emergence of new technologies. However, it plainly is not. The primary legal tests for determining what is, and is not, deserving of patent protection – novelty, inventive step, and the provision of a sufficient disclosure of the invention – are proving inadequate to deal fairly and consistently with computer-implemented innovations. As a result, the blunt instrument of subject matter eligibility has become the tool of choice for striking down claims that are deemed to be unworthy of protection.